Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1940

Alice Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company and
Utah Motor Park Incorporated : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
I. B. Wight; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Loos v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. and Utah Motor Park Inc., No. 6211 (Utah Supreme Court, 1940).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/586

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

,..,r-J-'
~;. ··/ ·-'·

No. 6211

In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
ALICE LOOS,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.
MOUNrrAIN FUEL SUPPLY COM)
pANY, a Corporation, and UTAH
MOTOR PARK, INCORPORATED,
a Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal From the District Court of Salt Lake
County, Utah.
Honorable P. C. Evans, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
L. B. WIGHT,
Attornev for Plaintiff
and. Respondent.

FILED
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Argument and Authorities . . . . . . . ..... 10-30
Questions to be Determined ............ 10-30
1.-Was there Sufficient Evidence to
Warrant Submission to Jury~ .. 10-21
2.-Was it Error, Refusing to Ins.truct
that Doctrine Res Ipsa Loquitur
Not Applicable in this Case~ .... 21-25
3.-Did the Court Assume, Repeatedly,
or at All, in Rs Instructions that
Defendant's Pipes ·Were• Defective
and that Gas Was Escaping~ ...... 25
4.-Motor Park Responsibility ........ 26
5.-Motor Park's Assumptions ....... -.27
6.-Motor Park's lOth Request- Brief
and Argument of Gas Company .. 28-30
Statement and Review of Testimony .... 1-10
(Index Continued)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CITATIONS
22 American .Jurisprudence, p. 135, Sec. 14.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Atkinson v. Wichita Gas. Co., (Kan.), 18
Pac. (2d) 127. . .................. 20-30
52 A.L.R., page 864; Vol. 13, A.L.R.
page 837; Vol. 26, A. L. R., page 1253.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 1'2-13
Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co. (Wash.)
212 Pac. 283. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 15
Chicago Junct. RJy. Co. v. McAnrow, 114
Ill. App. 501.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 19
36 C. J., Sec. 887, p. 212. . . . . . . . . ......... 12
36 C. J., Sec. 899, p. 217 .................. 12
22

c.

J. 120.

' . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 16-17

22 C. J. 115, Sec. 55. . . . . . . . . . .......... 18
22

c.

J. 120............................ 18

23 C. J. 54-5, Sec. 1797................... 18
28 C. J. 600, Sec. 69.. . . . . . . . . . .......... 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CITATIONS
25 Corpus Juris 185, Sec. 8............... 26
Deardon v. S.P.L.A. &S.L.R. Co., 33
Utah 147.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 23--24
Decree The Queene, 78 Fed. 155. . ........ 17
Ferguson v. Boston Gaslight Co., (Mass.)
49 N. E. 115. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 20-30
Gerdes v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 27 Pac.
(2d) 365, 370..... .. . .. . . . .. ..... 22~24
2 Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, p.
26-30, Sec. 181., p. 57-61, Sec. 184....... 24
Sec. 181, Vol. 2, Jones' Commentaries on
Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 15
Kirby v. Tallmage, 40 L. Ed. 463.......... 17
:Memphis Cons. Gas Co. v. Creighton, 183
Fed. 552, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 20
Miller v. Wichita Gas: Co., (Kan.) 33 Pac.
(2d) 130 ........................... 30

(Table Continued)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CITATIONS
{A Continuation)
"Negligence," 45 Corpus Juris 846, Sec.
264. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 27
Nonnamaker v. Kay County Gas Co.,
(Okla.), 253 Pac. 296. . . . . . . .......... 20
Paul v. S .. L. C. R. Co., 30 Utah 41; 34
Utah 1·. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 23.
Sa.wyer v. Southern California. Gas Co.,
(Cal.), 2·74 Pac. 544. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 13
So. Indiana Gas Co. v. Tyner, (Ind.), 97
N. E . 580. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 20-30
Stella Gor~cht v. Beckwith, 135 Atl. 20;
52~ A.L.R .. 858................ ·-· ... 12
Van Horn v. Pac. Refining & R. Co., 148
Pac. 951: .· .......................... 25
·Western etc. R. Co. v. Morrison, (Ga.)
2.9 S.E. 104........................ 16
Windish v. People's Nat. Gas Co., (:P'a.)
93 Atl. 1003. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 19-20, 30
Wright v. So. Counties Gas Co., (Cal.),
283 Pac. 823. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

r~

The ~upreme <9ourt
~tate
,-_,r: ..·

'--'_r

of the

.:

of Utah

-)-~.

ALICE LOOS,
'!. _,.r,
Plaintiff and Respondent

MOUN'rAIN FUEL SUPPLY COM.PANY, a_ Corporation, and -UTAH
MOTOR PARK, INCORPOnATED,
a Corporation,
.
,
Defendants and Appellants.
~

r

._

./rfJr ·n

RESPONDEN·T'S
BRIEF
-,.- .!_-:~:'

BTATEMENT AND REVIEW.OF TESTI!IONY
'

r

.

,~

'

·:The respondent was injured by an explosion of
gas under the floor of an apartment of the ·appellant( Utah Motor: Park,' Iric.;- hereinafter referred
to as Motor Park, -which she~ was occupying as a
tenant of that corrip.any, 'on" :January 22, 1938. The
building was wrecked by the explosion and set on
fire.' She received ·sever·e injuries and partial
asphyxiation and was- taken to a hospital for care
and~tr~atment. The bones of both feet and lower
leg :were fractured, that of the left foot being a
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compound comminuted fracture which became infected and impossible to cure, and it was necessary
to amputate that le,g below the knee. This was
done on July 13, 1938, at which time her weight had
!decreased from 118 to 80 pounds. She was able to
leave the hospital August 14th, but was unable to
wear an artificial limb up to the date of.trial, without discomfort, by reason of a nerve involvement in
the stump of her limb.
It is admitted by the respondent that the appellant Fuel Supply Company, hereinafter referred to
as Gas Company, supplied natural gas to the Motor
Park and the Motor Park to its furnished cottages,
including that occupied by respondent at the time of
the accident.
It is alleged by the said complaint, among other
things, as follows:

5.
16 That the defendants knew, or should have
known, that by reason of the danger that
said pipes and connections would become
cracked and broken, or otherwise develop
leaks and permit gas t'o escape into said
apartment or into the area under the floor
thereof where said pilot light was maintained as aforesaid, and by reason of the
great inflamability and explosive force of
such gas when mixed with air, it was the
duty of said defendants to make and keep
said pipes and connections free from
breaks, leaks or imperfections by which gas
17 might escape therefrom . . . and to make
frequent and careful inspection of said
pipes for the safety and protection of the
tenants occupying said apartments; and it
was likewise the duty of said defendants
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
to provide proper and sufficient ventilation
of the area under the floor of said apartment so that should gas leak or escape into
said area it would pass freely therefrom
and not be confined therein, and to maintain said ventilation facilities free from
obstructions.

6.
That the defendants . . . carelessly and
negligently failed and neglected to provide,
proper and sufficient ventilation for the
area under said apartments, . . . and carelessly and negligently failed and omitted to
make frequent or any inspection of said
pipes, connections and premises fon the
protection of the occupants of said apartment, and neglig·ently and carelessly continued to furnish gas under pressure to the
apartment so occupied by plaintiff after
they knew, or by the exercise of ordinary
care should have known that said pipes
were broken, defective and leaking gas
into the area under said floor . . . .
7.

That by reason of such negligent acts
and omissions on the part of the defendants said pipes and connections were
cracked and broken and gas in large
quantities leaked into the area under said
floor and became mixed with the air therein and was not permitted to escape therefrom on said 22nd day of January, 1938,
and became ignited and exploded with
great force, (etc.)
In support of these allegations attention is
called to the following evidence, which for conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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venience, is abstracted according to subject matter
rather than chronogically as given:
248

GEORGE LINDHOLM, manager of Utah Motor
Park, called by the plaintiff, testified:
That all but 12 of the 125 cabins of the
Motor Park have (had) gas. Continuing, he
said:

250

Any time we had a leak in the gas line.
or any leak was reported to us by any tenant
in the Park, or any employe had it reported
to him, they had instructions to report it to
the office, and call the Gas Company, and wealways did that. There was no charge for the
service, so there was no reason why we should
not call them. ·we reported to the Gas Company and they sent a service man out to take
care of it. I recall complaints or reports. that
gas was leaking from the pipes prior to the
22nd day of January, 1938, and in those cases
followed the usual custom and notified the Gas
Company.' They have a service department
and send a. service man there and he makes the
repairs, unless it is a broken pipe which has. to
be replaced, or defective equipment, and in that
251 case he notifies us and we have to engage somebody to replace them. I didn't keep any record of those .complaints at all at that time,
( J any. 1938) if (complaint) one was made we
called the Gas Company and they took care of
it. If they didn't take care of it within a certain time we would call them again. Sometimes
they couldn't take care of it immediately and
252 we would have to wait several hours. (On cross
examination by Mr. Jones) I did not report
253 to the Gas Company that anyone had notified
us of a leak in the. Bussell cabin, I have no recSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ollection of any leak being reported in the
Bussell cabin at all, - or in the vicinity of it.
or in the vicinity of the Loos cabin, there wa.s
reports of odors of gas. I smell gas around
a great many cabins, and I think any place gas
is used you will smell it, and people think because there is an odor of gas there is a. leak. It
is not necessarily a leak because you can go
into any cottage at any time and s.mell gas, at
least I can. They have taken care of greasing
valves and little items. If there is any major
repair we would have to engage a plumber to
make the replacement, but they take care of
practically, - I would say 98 percent of the
calls, anyway.
255

All e-mployes, both maids and the boys that
worked around the grounds, and Mr. Sheets
have always been told in case of a leak, or report of a gas leak, to call the Gas Company, and
that has always been done. There never has
been any charge for that service and there was
no reason why we should not call them. I have
always told them that leaks do not fix them259 selves. If anyone says there is a bad odor of
;gas we would call the Gas Company immed·
iately.

300

Beginning with October, 1937 until I left,
January 15th, it seems to me there were quite
301 a number of calls to the Gas Company. I don't
remember any particular calls., but I know that
during the winter months with all floor furnaces in operation and quite a number of permanent tenants, there were calls quite often.
302

If there were gas leaks we reported it to
the Gas Company, always called the Gas Com-
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pany. After they had made the repairs the ga~
man would not leave until it was repaired. He
would require us to sign a small slip tliat he
had there showing that the 1·epair had been
made, -they would bring it in the office and
say the repair had been made, and we would
sign it.
307

Q. You haven't any information as to how
this accident occurred~

Objection by defendants. sustained.
Q. ·Were you present when any of these
furnaces were installed~

Objection by defendants sustained.

WILLIAM DAWSON occupied the second cottage south from the Loos cottage and sep. arated from it by two 8-foot open garages between which was an empty cottage. One roof
covered five of these double cottages., of which
the Loos cottage was the ce:Q.ter.
179-80 Moved in in December, prior to the explmlion on Jany. 22nd. Observed the odor of
180 gas in our own and in Swager's apartment,
(the one immediately n~rth of the L_gos cabin).
It was fixed I suppose, but we always did smell
gas.
How frequentlyY
A. Well, continuous, I would say. I reported it before it was fixed, and then they
fixed it, and I supposed everything was ail
right, and it was just a natural thing to be
there; I observed the odor of gas after it was
Q.
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fixed, and that odor continued to the time of
the explosion as near as I can remember.
183

'rhey tore up the floor and got down in
there and done something, but what it was I
don't know. (184) around the 1st of January.
184 Didn't notice a stronger odor near the appli·
ances. 1\Irs. Swager stated that she noticed the
188 odor of gas.
HARVEY B. BUSSELL, lived in the east
apartment immediately south of the Loos
apartment from October 15, 19·37, to May 1,
1938.
193
\Y e had noticed the smell of gas and we
had notified them a couple of times, J any. 2
. or 3, and January 17. Nothing was done about
194 it so far as I know. In the apartment you
·would smell an odor a good bit of the time, hut
you get used to it. We had company one evening, ~d he called my attention to it, and I
hadn't even noticed it. I looked at the appliance and there wasn't anything leaking so I
told him, "Well, I guess it is in the air."
197

In our cabin for a considerable period of
time prior to the explosion we would smell the
:odor of gas now and then, but not had. It
seemed like we would sn1ell it more in the
garage but if there was a little breeze blowing
you didn't notice it.

ROSA LOUISE BUSSELL, lived with her
husband in the cahin to the south of the Loos
201 cabin in the east end.
203
Prior to the explosion she observed the
odor of gas in the driveway between her own
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and the ·Wheeler apartment and reported it to
Mr. Sheets. Observed the odor most of the
!time, the really pronounced odor was the 17th.
(The Wheelers lived in the east end of the
building occupied by plaintiff).
204

There was always a little odor, two times
it was noticed real bad, the 2nd or 3rd and th~
17th, and on both occasions, nothing was don(l\
about it after I notified them. (Referring to
209 Jany. 2-3). A strong odor of gas, the most of
the odor coming by Loos's (210). You could
smell it strong. It was an awful strong odor.
212 The odor was always there. It was a pro213 nounced odor, the same strong odor ~ the
time. I noticed the odor right along,, but the
two worst odors was the 17th, but there was an
odor right along all the time.
225

Why was the odor still there, - why was
the explosion, if anything was done about it
by the officials~ Why ~ause the expJosion if
:anything was done, something must have been
wrong.

CLARA TISSOT. Lived in the apartment
next east of the building of which the Looses
120 occupied the west end, from November 1st until after the explosion.
Observed the odor of gas in the kitchen
and als'o outside. Observed it every day after
228 being there about a month. I went to Mr.
2'29 Sheets and said ''The gas is smelling sometthing terrible over there and I wish you would
fix it.'' So about a couple of days later they
made an investigation and dug up the pipes.

227
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230 The odor was not so bad afterward hut I still
noticed it, and especially on the outside.
231-2 Some one came down and tore up the pipes
under our cabin a month or so before the explosion. They were in there all the time doing
something - had the stove out in the middlo
of room half the time.
234

237
238
239
240

I remember remarking it to Mr. Ford, who
lived next door. We used to speak of it often,
and we would say, ''Gee, it is certainly terrible
today."
JOHN SWAGER lived at the Motor Park before the explosion, in the west side of the apart..
ment just north of Loos 's, since Thanksgiving
time in 1937. Observed the odor of gas on the
day of the explosion in his apartment, - not
outside. Mentioned it (the odor of g~as,) to his
wife, or she to him two or three times. It happened to be at night and ''we left the window
!open, and sometimes we would open the door
just to be sure it didn't get too strong in
there.''

MR. LOOS testified that he had made an effort
246 to locate the Fords and Wheelers and has been
unable to locate them.
38, 262 De-mand was made by plaintiff, and
served on both defendants April 27, 1939. for
inspection and production at the trial for use
of plaintiff as evidence, o£ the pipes 1 unions
and connections used in supplying gas to apart. ment No. 403 and the adjacent apartment, and
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certain parts of the partition through whicli
said pipes were placed.
262

Stipulation that record be made in the ab'.sence of the jury. Certain pieces of pipe pro263 duced. Mr. Slusser appeared, represented by
Mr. Rice, Asst. Attorney General, and claimed
privilege under Sections 104-49-3 and 104-49-14,
sustained by the court.
264

iThat both defendants joined in said objection. That the Utah Motor P13.rk, which produced the pipe, definitely informed plaintiff
that it claimed no responsibility for being able
to identify the pipe it did produce as being in
any way involved in the accident.

THE QESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED

1.
WAS THERE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT SUBMISSION TO THE JURY?
That there was an explosion under the floor
of the apartment and that the plaintiff wag injured
by it is admitted by both defendants; that she was
confined in a hospital from the date of th~ explosion until August 14th, and that her leg was amputated on July 13th; is· nowhere disputed. That
iher hospital bill of $966.28 (Ab. 22) Dr. Baldwin's
charge of $250.00 for services, (Ab. 21) and Dr.
Wight's charge for a like amount, (Tr. 118); the
charge of George Abbott of $25.00 each for giving
blood for two transfusions, (Tr. 118) were all reasonable charges; that the plaintiff lost property of
'the value of $149.64, (Ab. 27) was stipulated and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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agreed to by the defendants. That it was gas which
exploded is beyond question, and that gas was possessed of great explosive force would seem to be
sufficiently proved by what happened to plaintiff
and the building 8he was in at the time. That
there was not sufficient ventilation provided to prevent accumulation of gas in dangerous quantities
may also be inferred from what happened there.
That the pipes and connections were not in:;pected by either defendant, but on the contrary the
duty of reporting leaks was left to tenants is estahlished and is not in dispute. That their reports were
not followed by prompt attention, and on two specific occasions during the 20 days immediately hefore the explosion, not at all, sufficiently appears
in this record.
The plaintiff testified that she smelled no gas
at any time until the instant of the explosion, (Ab.
30). She and her husband were away during the
day and usually out during the evening, and there is
no claim by the defendants that she or ber hushand
had notice of the escape of gas as the other tenants
seem, from their testimony, to have had.
If the evidence was not sufficient to establish
thE· cause of the explosion, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur would apply as to the Motor Park. The
apartment leased to the plaintiff was furnished,it constitutPd a portion only of the premises of tlie
Motor Park, - it was leased for a short period,
week to week, and she had neither the duty or the
right to make changes or repairs, least of all to the
system of pipes by which her apartment was supplied with gas.
Where the landlord leases separate por~ions of the same property to different ten . .
ants, and reserves under his control cerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tain parts to be used in common by all the
tenants, he is, under an implied obligation
to keep the parts over which he so reserves
control in repair, . . . and where a landlord who has let a building to several tenants, has not demised certain portions of
the building to which the tenants have no
right of acces:s and concerning which they
have no right to make repairs the landlord
will be liable to the tenant for the defec.tive
condition of such portions due to his neglect
to make repairs.. Furthermore, where a
landlord ltas furnished agencies, appli..
ances or instrumentalities for the use of
several tenants in the building, he is in
general liable for any injuries arising from
his neglect to keep the same in proper repair, . . . and he will not be relieved by
the employment of an independent contracor.
36 C. J.,

Sec~

887, p. 212.

And he will be liable for his failure to pre:vent the escape of gas from pipes in such
quantities as to be dangerous to a tenant.
36 C..J., Sec. 899, p. 217.
Following the rule in such cases the New Hampshire Court held that in an action for injuries resulting from a dt!fective gas heater, it was no de\fens.e either that the heater was installed by the gas
company, or that the condition existed at the time
the tenancy began.
Stella Gorhecht v. Beckwith, 135 Atl. 20;
52 A.L.R. 858.
The note following this case in 52 A. I.... R.
found on page 864, et seq. is supplementary to tho_se
at page 837 of Vol. 13, and page 1253 of Vol. 26,
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A.L.R. It will be found that the conclusion of thd
editor is, that
Where the landlord installs a plant or system, not for the benefit of any particular
tenant but for the benefit of different tenants in common, it matters not where the
apparatus is located with regard to the
portions of the premises in the possession
of tenants, it is his duty to use ordinary
care and diligence to keep such apparatus
in repair, and it will be deemed to be under
his control for this purpose, and if he negligently permits any of such apparatus to
become defective, and injury thereby results to a tenant or his property, the landlord is liable therefor.
Gas Companies are distributors of a highly explosive and inflamable substance,
possess tech...-rrical knowledge of the danger
to be guarded against in handling and installing gas appliances for illuminating
and commercial purposes far beyond the
knowledge possessed by the average person. It would appear to he the duty of a
,gas company to make some inquiry or investigation to satisfy itself that all openings in the house pipes were closed at tlie
time it turns on its meters.
Sawyer v. Southern California Gas Co.,
(Cal.), 27 4 Pac. 544.
In this case, as in the present one, the gas company's pipes extended to the meter, and the pipes
on the premises were owned and installed by the
owner of the premis'es. It lacked one element established in the present case, however, that the gas
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

company had made at least ninety-eight percent
of the repairs of the pipes, connections and appliances since their installation and must have known
of their condition and that they leaked and that
the odor of gas was distinguishable at ana about
the cabin leased to plaintiff since the October pre-·
ceding the explosion, during which time the gas
company received notice of their condition. {Tr.
250-1, 300).
The Gas Company not only had knowledge of
the condition of the pipes, connections and appliances within the Motor Park and their need of frequent repair, and of the dangerous nature of its
product, but it also knew that the Motor Park made
no inspection but merely reported to it when the
odor of gas became so offensive to tenants .that
they made complaint about it
Whilr. no absolute standard of duty in
dealing with such ~gencies (gas) can be
prescribed, it is s~afe to say in general
terms that every reasonable precaution
suggested by ~xperience and the known
oangers of the subject ought to be taken.
This would require, not only that the pipes
and fittings should be of suchl material
and workmanRhip, and laid in the ground
with such skill arid care as to provide
against the escape of gas therefrom when
;new, but that such system of inspection
should be maintained as would insure reasonable promptness in the detection . . .
of leaks that might occur from the deterioration of the maferials of the pipes,
or from any other cause within the cirSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cumspection of men of ordinary skill in
business.
Castner v. Tacoma Gas & Fuel Co. (Wash.)
212 Pac. 283.
"It is certainly a maxim that all evidence
is to be weighed according to the proof which
it was in the power of one side to have· produced, and in the power of the other to
ha,?e contradicted." Lord Mansfield,. as
quoted by :Mr. ·Wigmore, (Sec. 285) in his
work on evidence.
He is discussing the failure to bring before
the tribunal some circumstance, document or witness when either the party himself or his opponent
claims that the facts would be elucidated by the
production of such evidence, and says:· that such
failure Rerves to indicate,
''as the most natural inference. that the
party fears to do so, and this fear is some
evidence that the circums.tance, or document, or witness, if brought, would expose
facts unfavorable to the party." . . .
''The propriety of such an inference is not
to be doubted.''
'' . . . and where the fact is one peculiarly within the knowledge of one of the parties slight evidence may suffice for that
purpose.'' (Of shifting the burden of
proof) "Where the facts lie solely within the knowledge of one party, there is an
important consideration in determining
the amount of evidence produced by the
other party.''
Sec. 181, Vol. 2, Jones' Commentaries on
Evidence.
1

It will be noted that only the Motor Park produced any evidence, and none whatever with refSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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erence to the installation of the pipes, or their condition at the time of the explosion. Appellants, it
is to be presumed, had definite information as to
the cause of the explosion. Respondent had none,
hut did produce at the trial the person who made
an examination for the Public Service Commission
of the conditions there, (Trans. 125) and both
appellants claimed the information which he had
to be privileged. (Ab. 52). Plaintiff demanded
the production of the pipes and connections (Ab.
39) which were not produced except in part, and
their identity not vouched for. (Ah. 50-51).
Plaintiff also sought to cross-examine the manager of the Motor Park with reference to these matters, and objections interposed by both defendants
thereto were sustained, (Ab. 74), upon the ground
that the matter not having been inquired into on
direct examination the question was not proper on
cross examination. Both defendants, therefore,
failed to produce evidence as to the time when the
system of pipes were laid, - as to their condition,
- as to where the leak occurred, or any other fact
in relation thereto. They may now argue that the
witnesses were equally available to the plaintiff,
but no unfavorable inferences can arise as against
the plaintiff for that reason.
No unfavorable inference can arise from a
party's failure to call or examine a witness
who, although possessing peculiar knowledge of the facts, is adverse to him; . . .
·Western etc. R. Co. v. Morrison, (Ga.)
·2.9 S.E. 104.
22 c. J. 120.
On the other hand,
When the circumstances in proof tend to
fix a liability on a party who has it in his
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power to offer evidence of all the facts, as
they existed, and rebut the inferences
which the circumstances in proof tend to
establish, and he fails to offer such proof,
the natural conclusion is that the pxoof,
if produced, would support the inferences
against him.
Decree The Queene, 78 Fed. 155.
As they (defendants) had it in their power
to explain the suspicious circumstances
connected with the transaction, we regard
their failure to do so as a proper subject
of cominent.

''All evidence,'' said Lord Mansfield in
Blatch v. Archer,. Cowp. 63, 65, ''is to be
weighed according to the proof which it
was in the power of one side· to have produced and in the power of the other side
to have contradicted . . . ''
''The conduct of the party in omitting to
produce that evidence in elucidation of the
subject matter in dispute, which is within
his power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge, frequently affords
occasion for presumptions against him,
since it raises strong suspicion that such
evidence, if adduced, would operate to his
prejudice.'' (Quoted from Starkie on Evidence, Vol. 1~ p. 54).
Kirby v. Tallmage, 40 L. Ed. 463.
Where it is apparent that a party has the
power to produce evidence of a more explicit, direct and satisfactory character
than that which he does introduce and rely
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upon, it may be presumed that if the more
satisfactory evidence had been produced it
would have been detrimental to him and laid
open deficiencies in and objections to his
case which the more obscure and uncertain
evidence did not disclose.
22 C. J. 115, Sec. 55.
The failure of a litigant to testify as to
facts material to hls ca.se and as to which
he has especially full knowledge creates
·an inference that he refrained from testjfying because the truth, if made to
appear, would not aid his contention.
22

c.

J. 120.

The Jury had a right, whether so instructed
or not, to indulg1e those inferences and presumptions which are natural and logical as well as legal.
A material fact which is not proved by
direct testimony may be inferred by the
court or jury from the facts which have
been so proved, even though the inference is not a necessary one, the rule being
that evidence which supplies a reasonable
ground for inferring facts essential to a
recovery or a defense is sufficient to support the inference. Appropriate inferences from proved facts are not a low
order of evidence, . . .
23 C. J. 54-5, Sec. 1797.

Weak evidence becomes strong by the
neglect of the party against whom it is
put in, in not showing, by means within
the easy control of that party, that the
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conclusion drawn from such evidence is untrue.
Chicago Junct. Ry. Co. v. MGAnrow, 114
Ill. App. 501.
Counsel for the Gas Company, in stating the
facts, says (Brief, p. 7) that the floor furnace was
installed by a licensed heating engineer. There is
no evidence that it was, nor is there evidence as to
where the Gas Company's pipes end and the Motor
Park pipes commence. It does appear thaf one
meter is within the Motor Park and the other at
the entrance.
The Gas Company, having made at least 98
percent of the repairs since the pipes were laid, regardless of when or by whom installed or who
owned them, had notice of their condition by so
doing. "Beginning with October, 1937," until
Lindholm, manager of Motor Park left on January
15, 1938, "there were quite a number of calls to
"the Gas Company" for the repair of leaks reported
by tenants, (Ab. 69), and duringj that entire time
the odor of gas was not stopped but was continuously present.
(Ab. 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40).
By the custom established and continued from the
installation of the system, it knew that the Motor
Park relied upon it to make repairs (Ab. 43, 44.
45~ 47) and the in~pection to determine where the
odor of gas originated.
A gas company which knows that the service line, which it is under no duty to repair, is rusted and corroded to such an extent that gas is permitted to escape, has,
the duty either to cause the service line to
be repaired by the person whose duty it
is to do so, or to have the gas shut off in
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order to avoid the. dangers that might
result.
Windish v: People's Nat. Gas Co., (Pia.)
93 Atl. 1003.
A gas company, after obtaining knowledge that the gas pipes in a custon1er's
building are leaking, undertakes by its
agent to find and repair the leaks, and fail~
to repair or negligently repairs the same,
and then continues to furnish gas th:rough
the defective pipes, and injury results to
a person who is without fault, the gas company is liable.
So. Indiana Gas Co. v. Tyner, (Ind.), 97
N.E. 580.
Ferguson v. Boston Gaslight Co., (Mass.)
49 N.E. 115.
Atkinson v. Wichita Gas. Co., (Kan.), 18
Pac. (2d) 127.
Nonnamaker v. Kay County Gas Co.,
(Okla.), 253 Pac. 296.
In the N onnamaker case last cited, the Court
quotes with approval from the case of
Memphis Cons. Gas Co. v. Creighton, 183
Fed. 552, as follows:
''A gas company, which through its pipes
supplies gas to a house and has control of
the apparatus for cutting off, when notified that gas is escaping in the house and
informed of injury or danger to the inmates therefrom, owes a duty to the occupants of the house to exercise reasonable
diligence in shutting off the gas therefrom, and it is immaterial that the pipes
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'vhere the leak occurred were owned by the
owner of the house,'' and continues:
It is the duty of a gas company when it receives notice from one of its customers that
gas is escaping into the building, to exercise reasonable diligence to cut off the g·as.
It is the duty of the gas company to cause
the gas to remain shut off until proper repairs are made in the pipes and fittings
by the owner or the gas company.
In this case, too, the question of notice to the
gas company was not submitted to the jury,· the
defendant had judgment and the case reversed hecause of that failure.
The court did not err in overn1ling the motions
of the defendants for non-suit, for a directed verdict, or in submitting it to the jury, nor in denying1
the motions for new trial on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence.

2.
·wAS IT ERROR IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT.
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR WAS NOT APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE~
The court could not know, nor could counsel,
that in considering the evidence the jury would infer from it that the gas pipes had been leaking that both defendants knew or had notice of it, and
that they were both chargeable with negligence. In
no other way may the verdict, under .the instructions given, be explained. By instructio~ No. 9 they
were expressly instructed that the mere happening
of the accident was no evidence of negligence on
the part of the Gas Company. (Ab. 9~2'). The only
instruction as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
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(No. 5; Ab. 90) was given at the request of the defendant who is now complaining that its requested
instruction No. 2 (Ab. 77) was not given instead.
This Court, in the Quinn case cited, (42 Utah
113) wherein the plaintiff was damaged by sp:illed
ink on defendant's counter where she went to pay
her gas bill, and in the Jensen case (87 Utah 434)
wherein plaintiff was injured by broken glass on
·the counter in defendant's s.tore, there being no
proof in either case that the defendant caused the
ink or broken glass to be there or had notice or
knowledge of it, and the place of the accident being
accessible and used generally by cus.tomers~ held
the doctrine not applicable.
In the Kendall case, 79 Ut. 256, cited by defense,
in which damage resulted from a fire, discovered
in an automobile after it had been left standing for
two hours, which spread to and destroyed a wheat
field, it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur did not apply.
In the Bunce case from Wyoming, 62 Pac. (2d) 1297,
the plaintiff had been an employe of the defendant
gas company for ten years - observed the leak in
the gas line to the water heater and turned it off,
and later turned it on again and attempted to light
it when the explosion occurred which injured him.
In the Gerdes case, California, 13 Pac. (2d) 393,
the defendant's gas mains were undermined and
broken by reason of a broken water main in the
street, gas escaped into the home of plaintiff, and
she refused to get out after being warned of her
danger.
In the Hohnemann case, (Cal.). 96 Pac. ( 2d) 350,
the action was on behalf of the minor children of
thP. owner of premises killed in an explosion. The
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gas meter was just inside the alley entrance to the
premises owned and in possession of the person
killed. The closed swivel in the pipe within the
premises had been removed and an open one inserted in the meter by someone, and a pipe in the
premises was uncapped, either or both of which
may hav(' caused the explosion. The Court s.aid, in
effect~ that there was no exclusive control by the
gas company and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
would not apply.
No case cited seems to be in point or ba.sed on
fact.s found in this one. Ownership of the leased
premises where plaintiff was injured was. in the
Motor Park. ~Its man·ager testified in the ~ease
that when complaint was made of the odor of gas
it made no investigation but called the gas company and left to it the duty of locating the leak and
repairing it. By so doing it cannot be heard to
~ay that it did not have exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused the injury. That duty
to inspect and repair was its own and could not be
avoided by sele:cting any agency to perform it.
\Vhen a thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence,
in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care.
·
Paul v. S. L. C. R. Co., 30 Utah 41; 34
Utah 1.
Deardon v. S.P.L.A. &S.L.R. Co., 33
Utah 147.
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2 Jones' Commentaries on Evidence, p.
2.6-30, Sec. 181., p. 57-61, Sec. 184.
Wright v. So. Counties Gas Co., (Cal.),
283 Pac. 823.
28 C. J. 600, Sec. 69.
But it is urged that, since the plaintiff
made specific allegations of negligence
with respect to a particular defective and
unsuitable brake and brake chain, he was
required to prove such facts specifically
as alleged by direct evidence, independent
of, and in addition to, any presumption
arising from the application of the maxim,
(res ipsa loquitur) . . .
That the plaintiff averred and undertook
to show a defective brake chain as evidence
of negligence causing the collision, did not
waive nor affect the presumption of negligence arising from the circumstances,
which was in itself sufficient to show
negligence.
Dearden v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R.
Co., 33 Utah 147.
The giving of the instruction (No. 5) was not
prejudicial to the defendant Motor Plark in any
event, and should not result in a reversal of the
judgment.
Gerdes v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 27 Pac.
(2d) 365~ 370.
In the ·Wright case, as here, the defendant
landlord of an apartment property urged that because it was possible for others to have used appliances, or interfered with the ,gas supply and so
caused the leak of gas which resulted in the exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plosion, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could
not apply. Quoting with approval from
Van Horn v. Pac. Refining & R. Co., 148
Pac. 951:
"We think the argument unsustained, as
it is by any semblance of evidence or proof
tending to show such interference with
this pipe or cap, carries the possibilities in
cases of this kind entirely too far." That
was a case in which the plaintiff was injured by the blowing off of a cap placed
insecurely upon a steam pipe. The Court
further in its opinion goes on to say that,
if such possibilities are allowed to prevent
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, it would in effect entirely eliminate the doctrine. . . .

In the case at bar the doctrine applies as
against the owner of the premises, irrespective of whether the gas company was
negligent, or whether some unknown person broke the seal ·and· the lock.

3.
DID THE COURT ASSUME IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS, "REPEATEDLY" OR AT ALL,
THAT DEFENDANT'S PIPES ·WERE DEFECTIVE AND THAT GAS ·WAS ESCAPING~

We have read the instructions carefully and
cannot find any sueh assumption or language from
which such assumption can be inferred. The int-:tructions e-xcept No. 4 about which complaint is
made were not given at the request of the plaintiff
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but of defendant Gas Company. The instructions
to which objection is made are copied in the brief,
but the particular language. from which any such
assumption can he drawn is. not pointed out nor
can this writer discover it. It. isn't there.

4.
The defendant Motor Park objects to the 2nd
instruction (Ab. 89) and asks, as its P!oint IV, if
·'the court erred in holding it to the same degree
of responsibility as the Gas Company.
The issues here are not between the two defendants and the court was not called upon to fix
the degree of responsibility between them, nor
did it.
The Motor Park may have been a consumer, as
between it and the Gas Company, and entitled to
.care commensurate with the inherent dangerous
character of gas, but as to the plaintiff it is to be
charged with the same degree of care.
In regard to any instrumentality, care must
be taken in proportion to the danger involved. Hence, commensurate care by persons having the possession and care of dangerous explosives is greater than the care
which would be required if such substance
were innocuous.
22 American .Jurisprudence, p. 135, Sec. 14.
One keeping or storing dangerous explosives must exercise reasonable care, which
is such care as is, commensurate with the
apparent danger.
25 Corpus Juris 185, Sec. 8.
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One knowingly using or dealing with a
dangerous agency must, except when his
duty is limited to refraining from willful
or wanton injury, exercise care commensurate with the risk or danger of injury
involved. . . .
''Negligence,'' 45 Corpus Juris 846, Sec.
264.

5.
We have already discussed the. duty of a landlord with reference to that portion of the leased
premises over which the tenant has no right of
access or repair, or was retained by the landlord for
use in common by several tenants. The Motor
Bark's requested instruction No. 4 (Ab. 78)
assumed facts contrary to the evidence in that it
assumed that there was no warranty as to the condition of the premises, (Ab. 28; Tr. 158) and is not
a correct statement of the law as to the duty of the
landlord to a tenant under circumstances disclosed
in the case.
Its request No.7 (Ab. 79-80) was also properly
refused, first because of the warranty of thP htndlord mentioned above, and second, because it would
have been in conflict with instruction No. 5 which
was given at the request of the defendant Motor
P,ark; and third, because, had the cause of the explosion b~en unexplained the plaintiff would have
been entitled to the application of the doctrine res,
ipsa loquitor.
Its requested instruction No. 8 (Ab. 80) would
have taken from the jury the rig·ht to consider the
prevalence of Rtrong odors of gas in the vicinity
of the Loos cabin - "continuous" from the preSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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:vious Oetober, .as indicative of the condition of the
pipes and~put a~ impossible burden upon the plain~iff. It, too, WOlJld have deprived tlie ·plaintiff of
the doctrine. of res ipsa loq~tur. That._part .of the
instruction ~which :was pr:oper· to be give!lJ us embodied in Nos. 7 and 8, which were given .at the request of the Motor Park, and the same is true. of its
request No':'.Jg (Ab:' 80:..1).
·-.:
' . J··l

.9.
The Motor Park's Point VI is basedjon- there!fusal of the court to give.its 10th ;requested ,instru.ri.·tion (Ab. 81-2). The court did better thatL that, i.t
·refrained from submitting.:: tlie. issue of the alleged
·;settling of the .builidng andr:non~equent breaking of
·n:he pipes at all. Having done~ so it would have been
~a useless thing j to instruct· them on an issue they
-knew nothing about; or to withdraw from them con·side:riation of ·a que&tion not submitted to ·them in
~the ·first instance.

Gas

'to

.
A~ (th-e bti~f a~d a~gume~( 6£ the
C.ompany we feel that the discussion of the s~iciency
of the ·evidence .-to ·take the case fo 'the jury, both
as to the Gas·~Company as.well as the::Motdr Park,
has already ·been ·sufficiently covered... In rits brief
it cites various· rrdses o:ir the general rule exempting gasc 'companies from liability for injuries
resulting from· ··def~ctive pipes ·which it did not in~stall and over which it' had no ~control,- and ·hdd· no
notice or knowledge: of· their defective 'condition.
It cites no case where those exceptions. existed and
.were discussed.
, .. .
r

Its third point' discussed~ i.e:, that the :doctrine
of res ipsa liquitur is not applicable to it, is a
straw man merely. No one has ·contended other,.
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wise, and the court, in its. instruction No. 9 (Ab.
92-3) so told the jury.

In· its Point IV the Gas Company insis,ts that
''the record contains no evidence that the Gas Company had· any notice or knowledge that gas, was
~scaping or leaking'' from the pipes or appliances
under or in the vicinity of the cottages involved in
the explosion.
There is evidence ( 1) that the odor. of. gas was
present in the vicinity since the month of October,
1937, and that it continued. until the explosion on
January 22, 1938; (2) That the Gas Company undertook to make repairs and did make. them to the extent of at least 98 percent, and must have known
the general condition of the sys tern ; . ( 3) That its
men, after making a repair, took a written record,
signed at the office of the Motor Park, which, it
may be inferred, had to be delivered: to.·. the· Gas
Company, and that record: is in its hands and' has
not been produced; ( 4) That it. undertook to make
the repairs for gas odors reported to it between
October and January 22nd (Tr.. 300, 301,. 2) ;- (5)
:That it undertook to inspect when. odon; of gas
were reported; (6) That the custom, had been so
long continued that it must have known, that the
Motor Park made no inspections, and only made
replacements when the Gas Company reported to
lit that pipes had to be replaced: (Tr~. 251) ; and
(7) it had, and is chargeable with notice. or the
highly oangerous character of its product, its tendency to escape confinement, to collect in inclosed
places, and to explode.
Having. undertaken to inspect and repair, discontinuance before the repairs were successfully
completed itself imposes on it liability for the resulting damage.
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Southern Indiana Gas Co. v. Tyner, (Ind.)
97 N .E. 580.
Ferguson v. Boston Gas, Light Co. (Mass.)
49 N.E. 115.
Atkinson v. ·Wichita Gas Co., (Kan.), 18
Pa.c. (2d) 127.
A gas company which knows that the
service line, which it is unaer no duty to
repair, is rusted and corroded to such an
extent as to permit gas to escape, has the
duty either to cause the service line to be
repaired by the person whose duty it is to
do so, or to have the gas shut off at the
street in order to avoid the dangers that
might result.
Windish v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., (:Pa.),
93 Atl. 1003.
A gias company undertaking to inspect consumer's appliances known to be throwing
off gas fumes must make inspection with
such thoroughness as will enable it to discover what is causing fumes, and shut off
gas until dangerous condition is remedied.
Miller v. Wichita Gas Co., (Kan.), 33 P.ac.
(2d) 130.
The points made and discussed by defendants
are without merit. The judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

L. B. WIGHT,
Attornev for Plaintiff
and. Respondent.
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